From soldiers to farmers: The political geography of Chinese Kuomintang territorialization in northern Thailand

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**A B S T R A C T**

This paper engages with the concept of territorialization through telling the story of the transformation of Chinese former Kuomintang (KMT) soldiers of Yunnanese origin and their descendants living in northern Thailand, from being opium and heroin traders and smugglers, to becoming mercenaries fighting against the Communist Party of Thailand in northern Thailand on behalf of the Thai military, to finally transforming into tea farmers and traders through receiving development aid support provided from the Republic of China (Taiwan). Taiwan’s development aid was ostensibly only for humanitarian purposes, but in reality also had important underlying political objectives. We argue territorialization is a more-than-human political technology. In particular, it is argued that territorialization frequently combines both military politics and development politics, even though the literature often separates these two elements, as if they are not frequently intertwined and interrelated. Here, we show how these two forms of politics, one explicit and one much less so, can come together to create new social and economic realities, ones with important geographical and geopolitical implications.

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**I n t r o d u c t i o n**

The so-called “Golden Triangle”, a largely mountainous area generally considered to include parts of northern Thailand, northeastern Myanmar or Burma, and northwestern Laos, has been a major opium-growing area since the nineteenth century (Trocki, 2011). Today, Myanmar still produces the second most opium of any country, surpassed only by Afghanistan (UN News Centre, 2014). At the northern Thai borderlands of the Golden Triangle, however, the once extensive landscape of opium poppies has been substantially transformed over the last few decades. Instead of hosting extensive plantations of poppy flowers, the high uplands of the northern Thailand border in Chiang Rai and Chiang Mai Provinces are now dominated by various other kinds of cash crops, including temperate climate vegetables and fruits, coffee, decorative flowers, and crucially for this article, tea. In accordance, the upland ethnic groups in northern Thailand, including the Akha, Lisu, Lahu, Iu Mien, Hmong and others—all of whom previously cultivated poppy—now mainly grow non-opium crops. This article relates to these changes, but is specifically about a group of Chinese soldiers of Yunnanese origin associated with the Kuomintang Party (KMT) and their dependents living in the uplands of northern Thailand along the border with Myanmar. After their defeat at the end of the (post-World War II) civil war in China, these KMT troops crossed into Burma in 1950. They stayed in the border region during the 1950s, until being forced into Laos and Thailand in 1960–61 by the Burmese military, with the assistance of the communist People’s Republic of China.

The transformations from opium poppy fields to alternative cash crops, and from being Chinese KMT soldiers to becoming Thai farmers, are the outcome of a complex set of intertwined geopolitical circumstances, beginning with civil war conflict and politics, to opium smuggling and trading, to becoming mercenaries fighting for the Thai army against a largely ethnic Hmong insurgency in northern Thailand linked to the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), and then finally to becoming Thai subjects and farmers growing legal cash crops. We examine how particular types of territorialization occurred during these periods, and we demonstrate that over time the KMT’s territorializing processes involved shifting from being primarily linked to Cold War conflict against communists and frontier drug trading, to becoming increasingly associated with modern agricultural development, supported by Thai Royal
Projects but also the government of the Republic of China (Taiwan). The Thai Royal Projects were initially launched to promote the eradication of opium and its substitution with legal upland crops, as well as to support the provision of improved education and health services, and rural infrastructure more generally. The Royal Projects developed within the context of counter-insurgency, and were implicitly designed to isolate the CPT. The projects also, however, indirectly and significantly acted as territorializing agents, ones designed to more closely link the KMT and other upland ethnic minority groups in northern Thailand to the nation state (Rossi, 2012; Walker, 2010).

This article, therefore, traces the historical processes of transformation amongst the KMT in northern Thailand, following their complex historical trajectory in the northern Thai borderland highlands. In particular, we argue that the political territorialization that has emerged has simultaneously been a result of both political and economic territorialization, and that these changes have gradually connected the northern Thai borderlands where many of these KMT continue to reside, to the global market economy, albeit no longer with the illegal market for opium, but instead the legal market for tea, particularly in Thailand. These changes necessitate that we remain attentive to various forms of politics, including politics related to development and nationalism.

The article therefore interrogates the idea of territory as an analytic tool in political geography. We proceed with a theoretical examination of the concept of territory. In addition to approaching territory as a “political technology” (Elden, 2010), we also argue that territorialization is a fundamentally historical process associated with both human and nonhuman elements and involving explicit and non-explicit politics and the politics of development. After an extended consideration of theoretical debates on territory, we then separate the empirical data into five parts based on different periods of the over half century of KMT inhabitation of the uplands of northern Thailand, although we stress that these periods are closely linked and frequently overlap.

The authors combined their relative strengths in order to conduct this research. On the one hand, Po-Yi is a Chinese native speaker from Taiwan and has done extensive research in Yunnan Province in mainland China regarding tea. However, until this project he had not worked in Thailand. Ian does not speak Chinese and has not conducted research on tea per se. However, he speaks Thai fluently, and has been doing research in Thailand for many years. He has also been conducting research about Hmong involvement in the CPT, including the role of former KMT in that conflict. When we first went to the field together in northern Thailand together in 2014, we initially conducted five interviews with four former KMT soldiers at Mae Salong. These interviewees were chosen because of their knowledge of the KMT’s involvement in fighting against the CPT. Sometimes Po-Yi conducted interviews in Chinese, and translated for Ian, and sometimes Ian conducted interviews in Thai and translated for Po-Yi. Later in both the summers and winters of 2014 and 2015, Po-Yi conducted additional fieldwork in Mae Salong, Wawi, and Phayaprai, interviewing 39 former KMT and their children in Chinese. These interviews were focused on understanding the development of tea in former KMT areas. Po-Yi also went to different agricultural areas in Mae Salong, Wawi, and Phayaprai to observe farming and production activities, including tea cultivation, processing, and marketing. Later, the Po-Yi also interviewed nine people in Taiwan regarding links between Taiwan and northern Thailand in relation to tea. Ian also conducted more research about the KMT and CPT in northern Thailand between 2012 and 2016, including interviewing 90 Hmong, Thai, Lu-Mien, and Khmu people who were either allied with the Thai military and the former KMT when they fought against the CPT, or who fought with the CPT against the Thai military and the former KMT. Ultimately, a total of 138 interviews were conducted by both researchers.

Territorialization as a more-than-human political technology

Territory has been an important analytic concept in political geography and allied fields for decades (Delaney, 2005). Echoing recent shifting attentions to the relational flows of populations and goods (Amin, 2002; Murdoch, 2006), geographers, and social scientists more generally, have urged scholars to reconsider the unproblematic definition of territory as a boundary-fixed space and power entity for the state (Allen & Cochrane, 2007). However, taking a relational approach does not necessarily conflict with territorial thinking (Antonsich, 2009; Jones, 2009; Painter, 2010).

In fact, to rethink the uncritical definitions of a static and bounded territory does not, and should not, mean ignoring states, since they still have the political power to territorialize sovereignty (Jonas, 2012). Indeed, as Elden (2010) argues, territory is a “political technology” employed by the sovereign authority of states to measure land and control terrain.

Territory, as a “political technology,” must be understood through its relation to both land and terrain. As Elden (2010: 804) states, land is “a relation of property, a finite resource that is distributed, allocated and owned, a political-economic question.” And terrain is “a relation of power, with a heritage in geology and military, the control of which allows the establishment and maintenance of order.” Territory, as terrain, is therefore a “political-strategic question” (Elden, 2010, p. 804). However, Elden (2010) pushes further to argue that “land” and “terrain” are necessary but insufficient to thoroughly catch the meanings of territory. “Measure and control — the technical and the legal — need to be thought of alongside land and terrain,” (Elden, 2010, pp. 811–812). In other words, territory as a political technology requires the political-legal dimension for the state to authorize the power to maintain order inside its territorial sovereignty. Meanwhile, a political technology also comprises the political-technical dimension involved with surveying and mapping techniques for producing a “legible” territory (Scott, 1998).

While acknowledging the significance of taking territory as a political technology in controlling and measuring geographical space, Antonsich (2011) points out that the issue of agency should be emphasized more when thinking about the production of territory. To highlight this, Antonsich (2011, p. 424) argues that territory is a “social space, produced by specific social practices and meanings which turn territory into both ‘semiotized’ and a ‘lived’ space.” Nevertheless, Antonsich’s emphasis on agency only considered human agency, without explicitly addressing the potential influence of nonhuman elements in the production of territory. Furthermore, Antonsich defines human agency as bottom-up practices realized through people’s everyday lives. Although perspectives from people’s everyday practices are certainly necessary, conceptualizing agency as only bottom-up could risk a simplified binary that divides top-down and the bottom-up conflicts in non-nuanced ways. We want to avoid this potential trap. Moreover, complex relations between human and nonhuman elements could be lost through employing this simplified dichotomy.

To grasp meanings of territory, we take territory as a political technology associated with both human and nonhuman agency. As Jonas (2012, p. 270) argues, geographers need further examinations “both of relational thinking about territorial politics and of territorial thinking about relational processes.” In line with this, recent scholarship has approached territorialization as a relational process containing both human and nonhuman elements. For example, Dittmer (2014) has applied the concept of assemblage (Deleuze & Guattari, 1987; see also; DeLanda, 2006) to propose a
“geopolitical assemblage” of territorialization and deterritorialization. A geopolitical assemblage of territory, following Dittmer (2014), emphasizes a relational ontology that locates agency in the interactions among multiple human and nonhuman components. Territory, hence, encompasses “volumes, flows and fluidity” through which a “[m]yriad of fragile socio-ecological processes criss-cross political space” (Grundy-Warr, Sithirth, & Yong, 2015, p. 95).

Deleuze and Guattari (1972) first introduced the concept of deterritorialization, emphasizing how fluid and schizophrenic human subjectivities are in contemporary globalized capitalist society, as well as the disembodied nature of current human relationships with particular spaces. Reterritorialization, in relation to the above definition, is the restructuring of a territory that has undergone the kind of deterritorialization described above. Therefore, deterritorialization and reterritorialization processes, in their various forms, can be considered to be forms of territorial politics. In the context of geopolitical geography, this demands careful examination of how the reach of sovereignty is “made up by making diverse elements hold together as a whole for a while (territorialization) but subject to continuous centrifugal forces at the same time (determinatorialization)” (Muller, 2015, p. 32).

Assemblage, though defined and applied in diverse ways, in general foregrounds “multiplicities irreducible to a single sense, structure, or logic,” and spans “the divide between nature and culture, humans and nonhumans” (Moore, 2005, p. 24). As a result, recent scholarship has applied assemblage to think about nonhuman agency. For example, Jane Bennett (2010: 35) proposes a congregational agency originating “from the very disposition of things.” In other words, agency, human or nonhuman, is not self-contained or independent, but congregational work based on the relational connections and arrangement between human and nonhuman factors.

To reconsider territory with assemblage and nonhuman agency, the notion of territorial assemblage “contained within it impulses of deterritorialization and reterritorialization, lines of flight away from locality and rootedness, as well as emplaced reconfigurations of arrangements within specific sites” (Moore, 2005, p. 332, note 116). However, critiques concerning assemblage point to its frequent occlusion of “power relations, historical sedimentations, and their forceful effects” (Moore, 2005, p. 24). Escobar’s (2008) project has reoriented attention to assemblage and the issues of power and history. More specifically, he has applied assemblage approaches to combine human and nonhuman actors for reconsidering territory of place and its interrelationship with social movements in Colombia. While Escobar emphasizes territorialisaton and deterritorialization realized through “strategies of localization” both by “capital, the state, and technoscience” and by “communities and social movements” (Escobar, 2008, p. 32), the kind of territorialisaton Escobar refers to has been more related to “region-territory of ethnic groups,” and less focused on the specific territorial state. Here, it is useful to reconsider Elden’s (2013) proposal of territory as a political technology, which significantly emphasizes the political, economic, legal, and technical powers, as well as the historical accounts in understanding territory. Therefore, territory as political technology and the assemblage approach with attention to nonhuman agency complement each other in understanding state territory.

For this paper, in accordance, we argue that territory is a more-than-human political technology. In northern Thailand it is linked to politics, but also to modern development processes, including ones that are not explicitly presented as political. By broadly thinking of territory as a political technology linked significantly to both the common realm of politics and also to the veiled politics of development (see Ferguson, 1990), we intend to provide an expanded understanding of “territorial politics”. We also consider the political technology of territorial production as practiced through relational processes associated with both human and nonhuman factors. Furthermore, based on this case study of the KMT-inhabited uplands of northern Thailand and the approach of territory as more-than-human technology, we also intend to reconsider the mutations in sovereignty. Recent scholarship has urged scholars to understand the idea of “sovereignty” beyond the western-centered perspective of “binary logic of developed/strong/ western sovereignty juxtaposed to an underdeveloped/weak/ southern one” (Sidaway, 2003, p. 174). Sovereignty and territory intersect as moments of the political-economic-natural assemblage. In this case study, elements of this include the KMT ex-combatants, the Kingdom of Thailand and its armed forces, the CPT, Taiwan, mainland China and—as we will describe—opium, tea and other cash crops. In accordance, while looking into “the diversity of renditions of sovereignty” (Sidaway, 2003, p. 174), we also intend to push further in order to rearticulate the mutations in sovereignty with our reconsideration of territory as a more-than-human political technology. The “technology” here, therefore, refers to not only the techniques in making a legible territory for sovereign control, such as measuring and mapping. It also refers to techniques linked to triggering the flows and arrangements of both human and nonhuman factors, such as the transplants of agricultural technology from Taiwan to northern Thailand in our specific case. These two dimensions of “technology” have thus helped to identify the territorial state or sovereignty not just in terms of its location, but also from the perspective of multi-scale politics and the resulting contextualized assemblage, or mutations, of “sovereignty’scapes” (Sidaway, 2003) in a non-western scenario.

**KMT Chinese in northern Thailand— the early days**

Since the late nineteenth century, the Thai State, influenced heavily by French and British colonial powers, has been working to consolidate its national sovereignty to form the “geo-body” of its nation-state (Winichakul, 1994). While the geographical construction of Thailand has been a territorializing force in the name of the national sovereignty, the borderlands of northern Thailand were, in many areas, only a “cartographic illusion” (Battersby, 1999, p. 474) on the map until the early 1980s. In other words, before then, the central government of Thailand did not thoroughly control its northernmost territory, especially remote mountainous border areas. In accordance, KMT soldiers and their dependents were able to easily come across the relatively porous border into northern Thailand without receiving approval from the Thai government. Specifically for the KMT soldiers, in 1960–61 a large number entered Thailand after being forced out of Burma. The Burmese government, on the one hand, was concerned that its fledging sovereignty was being violated by the KMT. On the other hand, the People’s Republic of China was concerned about the KMT using Burmese soil to launch attacks against them. Eventually, the People’s Republic of China and the Burmese government coordinated military operations to push the KMT out of the country. These vanquished troops settled on the Thai side of the border (Hsieh, 1997; Tan, 2009). They gathered and resided in thirteen villages on the northern Thai border area within Chiang Mai and Chiang Rai Provinces. After some time, the Thai government granted these KMT soldiers and their families’ temporary asylum with the hope that they would soon evacuate to Taiwan (Gibson & Chen, 2011).

Indeed, not all the KMT soldiers stayed in northern Thailand. Some left for Taiwan from Burma while others moved from Thailand (for details, see Gibson & Chen, 2011; Huang, 2010; Chang, 2001; 2002). Those remaining in northern Thailand found themselves in very difficult circumstances. They had not only faced
battlefield defeats in southwestern China and later Burma, but were in an economically perilous situation. Moreover, there were few good economic opportunities for the remnants of the former Chinese nationalist army from China. However, despite the hardship they faced, many of these KMT soldiers chose not to be evacuated to Taiwan, largely due to a belief that they might one day be able to return to Yunnan, China and reclaim the territory occupied by Chinese communist troops. Also, many chose to stay in northern Thailand because of the convenience of accessing the opium that they had become addicted to for years. Moreover, without any support from the outside, the KMT soldiers, in order to support the military troops and their families, became more and more involved in opium smuggling along the northern Thai borderlands.

The KMT as opium traders in the Golden Triangle

Although the KMT soldiers did not retreat into the northern upland borderlands in Thailand specifically to pursue opium trafficking, the main cash economy that they encountered in northern Thailand was related to opium. As one trading, the main cash economy that they encountered in northern Thailand was related to opium. As one former KMT general of the remaining troops, Tuan Hsi-Wen, said in 1967, “We have to continue to fight the evil of Communism, and to fight you must have an army, and an army must have guns, and to buy guns you must have money. In these mountains the only money is opium” (Weekend Telegraph, 1967, quoted in Gibson & Chen, 2011, p. 251). Highland ethnic minorities in northern Thailand were already cultivating poppy to supply national and international opium markets. Indeed, opium smoking had only become officially illegal in Thailand in 1959 (Baird, 2012), and in remote areas, such as the northern borderlands, central laws still had little leverage. Opium remained the linchpin of the economy and the law was effectively ignored. Indicative of its importance, opium production was promoted in CPT strongholds in Chiang Rai Province from the late 1960s to early 1980s, not for general consumption (except for elderly existing addicts) but as a cash crop for selling to people in areas controlled by the Thai government. Opium warlords, such as the infamous ethnic Shan opium and heroin trader, Khun Sa, were active in the same general area where the KMT settled, and the two groups initially cooperated, although later they squabbled and fought for supremacy in the opium trade. In that northern Thailand for the central government was still a relatively “invisible” frontier area partly out of direct state control, it should come as little surprise that KMT leaders started to refashion their forces from being an anti-communist army to being for-hire opium and heroin traders and smugglers (McCoy, 2003).

According to many of our informants amongst KMT veterans who still live in the northern Thai borderlands, getting involved with opium trade entailed troops imposing their own rules for controlling the open trade routes. The KMT soldiers also established checkpoints to gain control of trafficking routes. In accordance, the KMT soldiers established and protected caravans to facilitate the movement of large quantities of opium from Burma to the Thai or Lao borders. This escort service was, of course, not free (McCoy, 2003). The opium merchants, mostly from Burma, had to pay the KMT soldiers. The accepted fee in 1967 was “Thai Baht 180 per kilogram of opium, evenly split to cover caravan protection fees and a KMT-imposed tax on the opium’s value” (Gibson & Chen, 2011, p. 255). In general, before the early 1980s the competing armed forces associated with opium production and trade made northern Thailand a frontier where the Thai state had little control. During this period it was, in fact, the KMT soldiers’ familiarity and ability to cross international borders and make use of them to trade in opium and keep states from controlling them that allowed their opium trade protection business to thrive. Baird (2010) describes how the ethnic Brao people in what is now northeastern Cambodia and southern Laos made use of the border between the two French controlled states to evade state control during the beginning of the 20th century. The KMT employed a similar strategy in a different context.

The poppy plantations and opium trade in the Golden Triangle was crucially associated with the geopolitics of the Cold War. Simply put, during the Cold War era, in order to gain support from the ethnic minorities to fight against communist forces, the United States tolerated or implicitly supported the opium trade by its allies (Crooker, 1988; Gibson & Chen, 2011; McCoy, 2003). As a result, the underground opium economy in the Golden Triangle was oddly sustained through Cold War geopolitics. The sustained opium trade gave the KMT soldiers the chance to get by. In addition, Cold War geopolitics allowed the KMT soldiers to make themselves into a military force to fight against the expansion of communism in the northern Thai borderlands. However, the KMT soldiers no longer fought for the KMT government that lost the Chinese civil war and retreated to Taiwan. Instead, they entered into a specific agreement to fight against communists for the Thai state.

From opium smugglers to anti-communist mercenaries for the Thai state

In the late 1960s and early 1970s the CPT expanded its political and military strength in Thailand, including in northern Thailand. Conflict in northern Thailand broke out between the Thai State, and particularly local police, and ethnic Hmong highlanders in May 1967 in Chiang Rai Province (Race, 1974), and the CPT was able to recruit a large proportion of the Hmong population in northern Thailand following the escalation of conflict after this event. By the early 1970s the CPT, with strong political and material support from the People’s Republic of China, had become a significant threat to the Thai state (Marks, 1973; Race, 1974), and was able to establish a number of secure base areas under their full control in Thailand; all these “red” spaces were located in the uplands of the north. The Thai military had proven itself incapable of regaining control of these areas, and were frequently defeated in battle, especially when fighting the Hmong, who were very particularly competent upland jungle fighters (Marks, 1973; Race, 1974) when engaging in guerilla warfare in small groups, which was the strategy applied. Significantly, the CPT was even able to set a trap that led to the governor of Chiang Rai Province being shot and killed in an ambush in 1970. This incident clearly indicated that the Thai state and military were further losing control in the north, and thus they became increasingly eager to suppress the communist insurgency.

These geopolitical circumstances, and the Thai military’s battlefield losses against the CPT, led the Thai state to approach the KMT for military assistance fighting the communists, since its opium and heroin trading activities had acted to maintain its military fighting force. Moreover, KMT forces were familiar with fighting in the uplands, unlike the Thai army. Therefore, in 1970 the KMT agreed to help the Thai military fight against the CPT in Chiang Rai Province (Huang, 2010). In fact, the Thai military offered to hire the KMT, albeit at a low wage, and over time the KMT were also given Thai citizenship and rights to land as part of their negotiations with the Thai military.

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1 CIA (1965). In addition, many former KMT in Mae Salong, Chiang Rai Province, told us this during the time we conducted field research. However, we are not saying that everyone or even most people believed they would be able to return to China.

In addition, in the mid-1970s some former KMT also organized paramilitary forces supported by the Thai military to fight against the CPT in Chiang Rai Province. Crucially, however, these paramilitary fighting forces were not just made up of ethnic Han Chinese. While the Chinese were the leaders, many of the rank and file soldiers were from various ethnic minority groups, such as the Akha, Lisu and Lahu. Most did not speak much Thai, and communicated with their Han superiors in Chinese. Although the Chinese paramilitary leaders often treated their minority soldiers brutally, especially if they tried to retreat from fighting without explicit orders, these paramilitary units were nonetheless an important fighting force.

These KMT troops significantly enhanced Thai national security along the northern Thai borderlands by helping the Thai military to battle the insurgent communist forces in northern border areas. They engaged in much of the frontline fighting with the largely ethnic Hmong CPT in Chiang Rai, sometimes with artillery and other support provided by the Thai military. They also helped provide security for crucial strategic roads that the Thai military made in key communist areas. They suffered heavy losses fighting against the CPT, whereas the KMT had very few casualties from direct combat. More specifically, they engaged in two anti-communist campaigns, the first was a series of battles in various locations in the Doi Yao Pha Mon area of Chiang Rai Province between 1970 and 1974, and the second was a much shorter one-month campaign in the Khao Kho area of Phetchabun Province in 1981 (Fig. 1). As a result, the Thai government first granted the KMT soldiers land and later citizenship after the first campaign. However, the KMT were not the main reason for the demise of the CPT. Beijing’s relations with Vietnam and Laos deteriorated rapidly during the second half of the 1970s (Chanda, 1986; Evans & Rowley, 1984), resulting in the CPT losing access to safe areas for training and refuge in Laos, after they clearly backed the People’s Republic of China. In addition, after the Khmer Rouge was forced from power in Cambodia upon the Vietnamese invasion of the country in 1979, China agreed to stop supporting the CPT in exchange for the Thai government. These actions, including the introduction of alternative agriculture to opium, were closely associated with the KMT soldiers and their descendants (Gong, 2007; Huang, 2010).

Past studies concerning the KMT soldiers in northern Thailand have focused more on their migration and contested identities (Chang, 2005, 2006, 2008; Hsieh, 1997) and on Chinese cultural reproduction (Huang, 2010). Some have also considered the hill agriculture practiced by the Chinese diaspora, including the KMT soldiers and their descendants (Huang, 2005; Huang & Panomtaraníchagul, 2007). These studies have, however, generally emphasized the sustainability of agriculture practices by the Chinese diaspora communities without directly addressing geopolitics and associated relationships, both with groups of people but also between transplanted cash crops and the territorialization process of the northern Thai borderlands. This article, building on this literature, stresses the importance of considering the politics of territorialization through the lens of both politics and conflict and the cross-regional transfer of agriculture practices.

By including the transplanted cash crops of the KMT Chinese diaspora as a territorialization tool, but also recognizing the importance of a range of politics and military conflict as important agents of territorialization, we aim to relate both military and agricultural practices in the northern Thai borderlands to broader geopolitical circumstances. Among various kinds of transplanted cash crops, tea eventually emerged for various reasons, as one of the most successful for transforming the border landscape (Gong, 2007). It both helped secure the borderlands and increase connections between the Thai state and the former KMT soldiers and their families, while also increasing connections between the Chinese in northern Thailand and the Chinese in Taiwan, through both exchanges and via markets. In consequence, this article takes tea as being linked to explicitly political processes in terms of producing territory through a more-than-human political technology, but also as helping to construct new connections farther afield. Thus, it is appropriate that we consider the transfer of tea technologies from Taiwan to the northern Thai borderlands through two lenses: as a transplanted crop and as a cash crop. In doing this, it is crucial to consider the associated politics and market development that came with these interventions. First, we take tea as a transplanted crop whose plantation techniques have entailed the imperative to transform the murky forest into legible terrace plantation. Second, tea as a cash crop has turned the border into a legible landscape for a legal, and thus acceptable (to both Thailand and Taiwan) market economy. To clarify, even though tea is a transplanted crop and is a particular type of accepted cash crop (as opposed to opium), this...
does not mean that these two are mutually exclusive or separated processes when it comes to territorialization. Rather, tea as a transplanted cash crop has mutually enforced territorialization for both state sovereignty and the market economy, but has also created new kinds of social and economic connections with Taiwan. While these two processes are often seen as separate, we see national territorialization as not necessarily opposed to the simultaneous creation of new global connections, thus further complicating our understandings of sovereignty and territory.

**Tea as transplanted crop: turning the landscape into legible territory**

Most of the KMT in northern Thailand were not previously poppy growers themselves, but instead provided the service of transporting opium between producers and higher-level traders (Chang, 2011). However, in order to eliminate poppy planting, in 1969 the Thai government began implementing Thai Royal Projects in various upland areas in northern Thailand to replace opium production with cash crop plantations of various kinds (Hsieh, 2001; Latt & Roth, 2015). The Thai Royal Projects did not initially or explicitly support the transformation of KMT soldiers and their immediate families. Instead, the targets of Thai Royal Projects were mainly highland ethnic minorities who used to rely heavily on poppy plantations. Still, the Projects indirectly influenced the KMT soldiers and their families to consider starting their own cash crop plantations, including tea, and this was also influenced by Taiwan’s participation in supporting Thai Royal Projects. This was because most of the agricultural experts from Taiwan who participated in the Thai Royal Projects also started helping the former KMT soldiers and their families. This led them to become increasingly receptive to the transfer of agricultural techniques from Taiwan, which helped transform these soldiers into farmers.

Taiwan’s participation in the transfer of cash crop plantations to northern Thailand had two separate but interrelated components. One was mainly related to Thai Royal Projects and the other was specifically related to the KMT soldiers. First, Taiwan's participation in Thai Royal Projects started in 1973. The Veteran Affairs Council of the Republic of China (Taiwan), an official unit of Taiwan’s government, supported agricultural transfer that occurred as part of the Thai Royal Project. Starting from 1987, another quasi-governmental organization of Taiwan, the Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services (CARES), initiated an agricultural technology transfer initiative specifically for former-KMT soldiers. However, according to the agricultural experts in Taiwan who worked directly with Thai Royal Projects, aid for former KMT soldiers in the form of agricultural transfers started with Taiwan’s participation in Thai Royal Projects in 1973. Although Taiwanese agricultural experts were assigned to support Thai Royal Projects, they also visited villages of former KMT soldiers to support (though unofficially) the agricultural transformation. In other words, the transfer of agricultural techniques from Taiwan to the KMT troops actually began in the early 1970s.

When participating in Royal Projects, the nationalist government in Taiwan sent agricultural technicians and researchers to promote a variety of new alternative crops to opium. Although...
Taiwan was not the only foreign state supporting Royal Projects\(^4\), in Doi Ang Khang, in Fang District, the first site where the agricultural technicians and researchers from Taiwan contributed to the agricultural transformation of northern Thailand, a monument was established in 1980 to commemorate Taiwan’s role (Fig. 2). The success of Royal Projects, on the other hand, indirectly led to a livelihood crisis for the KMT troops due to the reduction of opium trade. In other words, since Royal Projects assisted the Thai government in encouraging highland ethnic minorities to stop cultivating poppy, generally preferring such measures to heavy-handed campaigns to destroy poppy plantations and punish planters (Crossette, 1984). It also heavily reduced the opium and heroin drug trafficking that the KMT soldiers had relied on. As a result, it was seen as necessary to extend Taiwan’s participation in the highland agricultural transformation to assisting the former KMT troops, so as to end their dependence on the diminishing drug trade.

From the perspective of the Thai government, although the KMT soldiers were gradually recognized as Thai citizens due to their role in fighting the CPT, the nationalist government in Taiwan still held responsibilities to address their future. Meanwhile, after the United Nations recognized the People’s Republic of China as the only lawful representative of China (en lieu of Taiwan) in 1971, more and more countries severed their formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Nonetheless, Taiwan strategically used other channels to maintain diplomatic connections, unofficially or semi-officially, with various countries. The transfer of agricultural techniques was one of the strategies used to maintain international relations (Hsieh, 2001). This was possible as agricultural support could be labeled as non-political developmental aid, even though in reality it was linked to geopolitics. Thus, although Thailand established diplomatic relations with People’s Republic of China and severed its relations with Taiwan in 1975, the transfer of agricultural techniques from Taiwan to northern Thailand continued through involvement in Royal Projects.

As already mentioned, Taiwan’s participation in Royal Projects did not directly assist the KMT soldiers but rather focused on supporting highland ethnic minorities. In fact, the government in Taiwan cut off all formal relations with the former KMT troops in northern Thailand in 1964 (Huang, 2010). However, the informal resumption of connections between Taiwan and the former KMT troops in Thailand gradually started via Taiwan’s diplomatic strategy of agricultural transfers to Thailand. In addition, further contact between Taiwan and former KMT troops also increased due to media coverage in Taiwan. Books, reports, and TV programs were important, such as the renowned writer, Bo Yang’s popular book Yyú (alien land) published in 1961 and the well-known follow-up movie also called Yyú, directed by Yen-Ping Chu. This media coverage publicized the “abandoned” KMT soldiers living in the northern Thai borderland. These stories ignited sympathy within the general public in Taiwan, which started calling for assistance to be extended to the KMT soldiers from both the government and society more generally. Thus, since the 1980s formal relations between Taiwan and the former KMT soldiers resumed through humanitarian assistance provided by the quasi-governmental organization, CARES, as we set out below.

### CARES, tea and territory

CARES initiated various programs to promote agricultural transfers to former KMT troops. According to some CARES staff responsible for these projects, Taiwan’s participation in Royal Projects initiated the resumption of contact between the “abandoned” troops and Taiwan’s society more broadly. Agricultural experts and technicians working with Royal Projects also witnessed the disparate hardship of the former nationalist troops, and played a quasi-diplomatic but unofficial role in resuming political contacts. As a result, CARES recruited those agricultural experts and technicians to further participate in the assistance for former KMT troops. The transfer of agricultural techniques, therefore, became the most important task for CARES (see also Gong, 2007). In accordance, CARES assisted Royal Projects and introduced a variety of new crops, including peach, plum, pear, persimmon, and tea. Among these newly introduced crops, tea is regarded by both CARES and the former KMT soldiers as the most successful. Interestingly, it is also the crop with the most cultural and economic potential for creating diplomatic and market links between the former KMT soldiers and Taiwan. Tea is a particularly popular drink in Taiwan, a drink with both important cultural and economic significance, and its physical properties also make it an ideal crop to be cultivated in abandoned places in northern Thailand, in tandem with reconforming mobility and transportation potential in the area.

The process of transforming the northern Thai borderlands into tea plantations was also a process of turning the former KMT soldiers into farmers. General Lei, one of the leaders of former KMT troops, once said that most of the KMT soldiers and their families “can only fight but cannot make and cultivate” (zhūhū dāzhōng būhū gēnghū) (Gong, 2007, p. 48). As for tea, the former KMT troops needed assistance in learning all the plantation skills necessary to become accomplished tea farmers. Meanwhile, since most of the CPT fighters took advantage of the Thai government...
amnesty in the early 1980s, the necessity for the Thai government to use former KMT troops for military purposes diminished rapidly. However, for the Thai government the former KMT troops were still a group of people with military backgrounds. As a result, it was deemed necessary to not only disarm them but also to turn them into farmers, so as to improve long-term border security. In other words, the transfer of agricultural techniques, including tea, from Taiwan to northern Thailand was not just (or arguably, only incidentally) for the development of agriculture per se. It was also a political strategy to shift the former KMT soldiers away from military activities and the associated commerce of opium.

Tea plantations and other agricultural transfers from Taiwan
have, indeed, substantially changed the agricultural landscape of the northern Thai borderlands. The previous “murky” border landscape full of opium trafficking and military conflicts was gradually transformed into “visible” terrace tea plantations and other crop farms. In James Scott’s (1998) terms, it can be said to have initiated a process to transform the northern Thai borderlands into what he calls a “legible” territory for the Thai state. Thus, tea as the transplanted plant from Taiwan has been an agent to mobilize the political strategies both in Taiwan and in Thailand. For Taiwan, it was a way to sustain Taiwan’s international relationship with Thailand, as well as to informally keep an eye on, maintain informal contacts, and provide support to the former KMT soldiers. For Thailand, such a strategy allowed for it to enhance sovereign control over its northern territory.

Moreover, in addition to being a transplanted crop for political purposes, tea has also become a cash crop that connects the northern Thai borderlands to the broader markets through tea trade, and especially trade with Taiwan.

The landscape of tea materialized the political-strategic and political-economic intentions embedded within the agricultural transfer projects. Additionally, all the imperative measuring and calculation for land distribution, and infrastructure construction for tea production are associated with the legal and technical dimensions emphasized in Elden’s idea of territory as a political technology.

**Tea for two purposes**

Tea as a transplanted crop has significantly contributed to transforming the Thai border landscape into a legible territory for the Thai state. This process of transformation has also led to a scenario through which the Thai borderland has become connected to the regional market economy of tea. Whilst the previous opium economy of the region also had broad geographical connections, this reconfiguration connected the northern Thai borderlands to other markets and spaces, particularly to the important tea market of Taiwan. Crucially, this economic reterritorialization as practiced through tea trade has been closely associated with the market fluctuations of tea in Taiwan, since tea production in Thailand has become closely linked to tea consumption in Taiwan.

Generally speaking, the total production of tea in Taiwan has gradually decreased since the early 1970s. However, the volume of tea consumption in Taiwan has increased. As a result, the demand for tea imports to Taiwan has grown over the past four decades (Zhou, 2014). This changing demand for imported tea in Taiwan became an opportunity for the former KMT soldiers in northern Thailand. Essentially, northern Thailand has become a production site of tea, Taiwanese style oolong tea in particular, outside Taiwan. The former KMT soldiers were able to connect to the tea market in Taiwan, because the tea they planted and the processing and packaging techniques they used were all from Taiwan. Moreover, the former KMT soldiers had cultural, linguistic, military, and kinship connections with Taiwan, which further facilitated the tea trade.

The market demand for imported tea in Taiwan, has not, however, solely relied on tea production in northern Thailand. Instead, recently Taiwan has substantially increased tea imports tea from Vietnam. The Taiwan Tea Trade Association (taiwan qu zhicha tongye gonghui) reported, in 2014, that over 70 percent of tea imported to Taiwan came from Vietnam (Taiwan Tea Trade Association, 2015), due to cheaper prices than tea from northern Thailand. As a result, the former KMT soldiers and their descendants who run tea businesses have lost market share in Taiwan and sought other markets. For example, Cuifeng, one of the major tea companies run by former KMT soldiers and their descendants, has become the main provider of tea leaves for the largest bottled tea company in Thailand, Oishi. Additionally, many tea producers, especially in Mae Salong, Chiang Rai Province, have tried to obtain organic certification to facilitate tea sales to European tourists who visit northern Thailand (Fig. 1). Tea has also initiated a new economic connection between northern Thailand and mainland China. Although some of the former KMT soldiers and their descendants are still vehemently

Fig. 1. Jungle clearance for a new terrace tea garden (photo reproduced by Po-Yi Hung with permission of the Chinese Association for Relief and Ensuing Services).
anti-communist, many of them, especially the tea merchants amongst them, and also some of the younger generation, have endeavored to expand their tea businesses to mainland China. Here again we can see how market forces appear to be trumping other factors, but there is also a particular political framing in which they are configured. While their political loyalty to Taiwan has been contested and their ethnic identities have also shifted (see Huang, 2010), economically most of the Chinese tea producers in northern Thailand are not against “making money from Chinese people.” In other words, while politically some of the former KMT in northern Thailand may still regard China as an enemy, economically they do not mind “making friends” with Chinese people. As a result, tea production among the former KMT has transformed the agriculture of northern Thailand from being a landscape of military politics to becoming a landscape of development politics.

**Linking military politics to developmental politics: a contested relationship with Taiwan**

While the former KMT combat tea producers in northern Thailand are seeking to reduce their dependence on Taiwan’s tea market, they have become ambivalent towards Taiwan’s involvement in tea production in northern Thailand. This ambivalence, we argue, comes from their contested relationship with Taiwan during the process when tea production shifted from being closely linked to military politics to being more specifically associated with development politics.

Most of the tea growers and producers of Chinese descent are, on the one hand, grateful for Taiwan’s efforts to transfer the techniques of tea plantations to northern Thailand. However, they also understand that the transfer of tea cultivation techniques from Taiwan was done primarily for political purposes. Because of this, many of our informants believe that the Taiwanese failed to thoroughly provide the former KMT soldiers with necessary survival skills, since it was not their main priority. As Yuanhong, a former KMT soldier and currently a tea businessman stated “They (the Taiwanese tea experts) always held back a trick or two (liuyishou)!” In other words, the transfer of tea plantations is considered to have been a “by-product” with a political benefit for Taiwan in terms of sustaining diplomatic relations with Thailand. Some informants, such as Chiahua, a hostel owner in Mae Salong, even think the transfer of tea plantations and other cash crops was done to disguise cooperation between the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Taiwan for “keeping an eye” on China. Although the exact association between the former KMT, the CIA, Taiwan, and the transfer of agriculture remains unclear, it is certainly true that Taiwan consulted with the CIA regarding a possible plan to invade and retake the mainland in the 1960s, one that was expected to involve KMT troops in northern Thailand (CIA, 1965). Nevertheless, the point here is that current tea producers’ doubts concerning Taiwan’s “hidden” motive for transferring tea technology to northern Thailand are significant. As a result, like Yuanhong and many other tea producers we interviewed do not think Taiwan was being “sincere” in helping to develop their tea industry. They believe that Taiwan is no longer supporting them because the previous political motive for providing support has faded.

“Taiwanese tea experts never taught us everything we needed [for tea production].” said one former KMT soldier informant who now cultivates tea. Many current tea producers in northern Thailand think the government of Taiwan never truly wanted a well-developed tea industry in northern Thailand. In addition, some even think that the government of Taiwan did not expect the tea plantations in northern Thailand to succeed and be sustainable after the political purpose of developing them disappeared. Many tea producers in northern Thailand stated in interviews that tea experts from Taiwan usually did not disclose the most critical knowledge about tea processing. They believe that if the government of Taiwan really wanted to successfully develop the tea industry in northern Thailand, the officials in Taiwan should have requested that the tea experts tell the tea producers everything. As one tea producer put it to us, “They did not teach us [the critical processing knowledge], so that they could come back to complain how bad our tea is [to lower the tea price]!” In addition, according to many former KMT soldiers tea producers, Taiwanese tea experts and merchants are notorious for lowering the prices of tea produced in northern Thailand, because in Taiwan they are also the major importers of tea from Thailand.

Indeed, the prices of tea produced in northern Thailand have greatly affected the trade relationships between the former KMT producers and tea merchants in Taiwan. Due to being undercut by Vietnamese producers, most of the tea-producing former KMT soldiers have gradually come to realize that they have to sell their tea to places other than Taiwan. Nevertheless, in order to keep, or even increase the value of tea produced in northern Thailand they still tend to consider Taiwan to be a place where the practical know-how about tea is well developed. As a result, while their feelings towards Taiwan’s tea experts and merchants have become more negative, some of them continue to hope that the quality of tea produced in northern Thailand will be endorsed by Taiwan’s tea experts and accepted in Taiwan’s market.

In order to expand market connections to other places beyond Taiwan, many tea producers in northern Thailand have attempted to produce better quality tea that can be sold at a higher price and have tried to develop their own know-how. Instead of looking for quality endorsements from Taiwan, some tea producers have made efforts to break away from the influence of Taiwan. As one tea producer said, “Our [oolong] tea should be ‘independent’ from the category of Taiwan-style oolong.” Some have urged the former KMT soldiers to reconsider their tea production relationship with Taiwan. Since the alleged hidden political motivation behind the transfer of tea plantations from Taiwan to northern Thailand has significantly diminished in their view, Taiwan, in the minds of many former KMT soldiers, can no longer be relied upon to “automatically” provide support for their tea production. In addition, the easing of political tensions between Beijing and Taipei has also strengthened their belief that their tea production will eventually become “their own business” without any influence from Taiwan. The younger generation is particularly eager to escape from the historical and political burden associated with the KMT in Taiwan and its fraught relationship with the Communist Party in China. Rather, they believe the only way to keep the tea business in northern Thailand viable is to learn how to compete in the regional tea market, including marketing tea to Taiwan, mainland China, and countries in Southeast Asia.

Compared to their increasingly conflicted attitudes to Taiwan, the former KMT soldiers tend to regard the Thai state as an active supporter of their efforts to develop their tea industry. When reminded of the past hardship of arriving in northern Thailand as soldiers, most of the tea growers and producers are grateful for the willingness of the Thai authorities to grant them land for developing plantations. In addition, the Thai state has promoted northern Thailand as a tea production center. For example, a local entrepreneurship stimulus program called One Tambon [Sub-District] One Product (OTOP) designated tea as the major product of Mae Salong Sub-District, a focal area for former KMT soldiers and their descendants. Nowadays northern Thailand, especially the province of Chiang Rai, has represented Mae Salong as an important place for tea in tourist guidebooks. While not all the former KMT living in the area agree with the tea promotion programs enacted by the Thai state, they perceive it as an active player in advertising...
northern Thailand as a tea place. As for the second or even the third generation of former KMT soldiers, they are mostly Thai citizens with less concern about military history. Meanwhile, the younger generations have endeavored to produce “Thai-style” oolong tea to represent both themselves and northern Thailand for expanding their tea market. As with so many other Thais subjects of Chinese descent, these younger people are gradually transforming themselves into being fully “Thai”.

Conclusions

The process of turning former KMT soldiers of into tea farmers and producers as well as Thai subjects is closely linked to territorialization. To note, the former KMT soldiers produce not only tea but other cash crops, including peaches, plums, lychee and coffee. However, tea has been regarded as the most successful crop. Moreover, the Thai government has promoted the One Tambon One Product (OTOP) to designate tea as the major agricultural product of Mae Salong. As a result, although tea is not the only cash crop seen in our study area, and is certainly far from the most important crop in northern Thailand generally, and with regard to former KMT soldiers, it does epitomize the relationship among the former KMT soldiers, agricultural transfers from Taiwan, and Thai borderland governance.

In turn, we argue that territory is simultaneously political and economic, but is also about the transformation of identities and sovereignty. Tea, or agriculture in general, represents one important way that this process has been materialized. We regard tea as an agent in this transformation process, including making the border landscape into “legible” terrains and lands. This has similarities to what Vanessa Lamb (2014) has argued in relation to the people living along the border between Thailand and Burma although in her case in the context of plans to develop large hydropower dams on the Salween River. In our case there are two intertwined dimensions: tea as a transplanted crop and tea as a cash crop. Tea as a transplanted crop is linked to a political action bringing about (re)territorialization. It turns the border into an ordered landscape, a legible territory for state sovereignty. Tea as a cash crop is also linked to a strategy for economic reterritorialization. It liberates the border and merges the borderlands with rules and practices closely linked to the market economy. Here we therefore highlight the entanglement of territory, sovereignty, and development that has materialized through the changing tea landscape along Thailand’s northern borders.

The story of tea development in northern Thailand lends itself to the dialogue between political geography and the assemblage approach in understanding territory as a more-than-human technology. Elden (2013, p. 10) asks us “to understand ‘territory’ as a distinctive mode of social/spatial organization, one that is historically and geographically limited and dependent” by “[r]ecognizing both [political-strategic and political-economic accounts], and seeing the development made possible by emerging techniques.” Elden’s argument echoes with Kim Dovey (2010), who has used assemblage to reconsider the relationship between place and its territory.

Based on the idea of assemblage, Dovey (2010, p. 21) argues that the territory of a place is situated in two different “socio-spatial segmentarities,” the state and the market. The state attempts to structure a place into rigid segmentarities by, for example, imposing fixed meanings with grand statements about the monuments of a place. The market, on the other hand, functions as a supple segmentarity, connecting different places through the flow of capital, information, and people. The territory of a place is thus drawn and redrawn through the intertwining of both rigid and supple segmentarities. Moreover, the rigid segmentarities of state power can resonate well with the argument of taking territory a terrain, a political-strategic technology to maintain the order. Additionally, the supple segmentarities of market forces, thus, echoes the argument of considering territory as a land, a political-economic question regarding distribution and allocation (Elden, 2010). Here, from the perspectives of rigid and supple segmentarities, as well as the viewpoints of territory as both a terrain and a land, “territoriality is creative rather than defensive, a form of becoming” (Dovey, 2010, p. 17).

The assemblage approach, combined with Elden’s argument, helps us to advance considering territory as a more-than-human political technology. With this vision of assemblage, we not only understand territory from both political and historical dimensions, caught up with sovereignty and subject formation but also take such history and politics as “infllected with the consequential materiality of milieu, of nonhuman entities and artifacts” (Moore, 2005, p. 24; italics in original). In accordance, our story has taken tea as an agent in forging the ongoing territorialization, deterritorialization, and rereterritorialization processes. Nevertheless, by taking tea as an agent, we do not intend to regard the agency of tea as a self-contained one. Instead, assemblage approach helps us with a vision of congregational agency (bennett, 2010), through which agency is more a collective work realized through the relational connections between multiple human and nonhuman elements.

This is a critical point for re-theorizing the relation between tea, former KMT soldiers, and territoriality in northern Thailand. Territory is not just a passive geographical space, but plays an active role in making northern Thailand into a tea place through both spatiality and sociality. Spatiality highlights the process from political territorialization to economic deterritorialization through which the transfer of tea from Taiwan to northern Thailand has shifted the landscape from being focused on military politics to being centered within new development and market frameworks, ones with their own particular forms of politics. Sociality flags the politics of forging connections among different elements in northern Thailand, including tea, former KMT soldiers, Taiwanese tea experts and merchants, and the agricultural programs executed by the Thai state. Therefore, territoriality in northern Thailand becomes a creative force, or a congregational agency, as Jane Bennett suggests, in integrating spatiality and sociality. As a consequence, the part of northern Thailand that we have investigated, as a tea place is a form of becoming due to the creative force of territoriality materialized through turning the former KMT soldiers into current tea farmers and producers with Thai citizenship. Thai sovereignty, as part of congregational agency, for controlling its borderlands has also been enfolded into the shifting assemblage of tea, former KMT soldiers, tea merchants and experts, mediating relations between Thailand, Taiwan, and mainland China. Sovereignty, in accordance, has never simply been a “thing” to be held by a nation-state, but a shifting and collective performance through the practices of assemblage that mobilize the creative force of territory.

Our story, of course, is not an end. During our field research, we witnessed mainland China’s increasing influence in northern Thailand, including on the former KMT soldiers and their descendants. For example, China has designated Yunnan Province as the “bridgehead” (qiaotoubao) (Su, 2013) to enhance its connections with Southeast Asia. In accordance, increasing investments from China have come to northern Thailand, including agribusiness, infrastructure like road construction, and even the promotion of Chinese language education for the young generations of descendants from the former KMT combatants in northern Thailand. On the other hand, the new ruling authority in Taiwan, the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), has also initiated a policy called “New Southward Policy” (xinnanxiang zhengce) to dilute Taiwan’s heavy investments in China by strengthening its relations with Southeast
Asia, including northern Thailand. While Taiwan has provided some investment in northern Thailand and throughout the country (Glassman, 2010), the effects of Taiwan's New Southward Policy remain uncertain. Although these terms, either China's "bridgehead" or Taiwan's "New Southward Policy," imply further geopolitics associated with both China and Taiwan trying to "reterritorialize" their political and economic influences into Southeast Asia, the reality is that mainland China's influence in Thailand is clearly outpacing Taiwan's. Indeed, Taiwan's influence in northern Thailand, including amongst former KMT soldiers and especially for their descendants, is in decline. The massive increase in mainland Chinese investment in Thailand, mainland Chinese tourism to Thailand, and the increased political ties with Thailand, especially since the 2014 coup d'état, all indicate the increasing influence of mainland China, and the decline of the relative influence of Taiwan. Nevertheless, Taiwan still has influence in parts of northern Thailand, albeit a minor and diminishing one, and therefore situated territorial politics in northern Thailand will continue to assemble different elements, both human and nonhuman, to realize the creative force of and to materialize territory as a more-than-human technology.

Conflict of interest

None.

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